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Abstract 
We assess the role of anti-social personality traits in explaining heterogeneity in commonly 
observed social preferences. We identified a personality profile that clearly reflects anti-social 
personality characteristics, with high positive loadings on Machiavellianism and high negative 
loadings on empathy, trustworthiness and agreeableness. Anti-sociality predicts decision 
strategies in a manner that is consistent with its name: significantly lower levels of trust and 
decreased trustworthiness. To identify the strategic nature of anti-social behavior in changing 
environments, we assessed the moderating role of personality on investor trust and trustee 
reciprocity in the presence relative to the absence of the investor’s option to punish. Our results 
show that only the anti-social personality profile is associated with specific payoff maximizing 
strategy shifts induced by these environmental changes: when punishment was not available to 
investors, we observe significantly lower levels of investor trust and trustee reciprocity, while 
there is a significant increase in both behaviors when punishment was available. These effects 
were specific for anti-sociality, as no other personality factor was associated with such a strong 
adjustment of decision strategies in the presence of punishment. These results demonstrate that 
anti-social personality characteristics are associated with strategic behavioral shifts aimed at 
maximizing the extraction of resources from their counterparts. The reliability of the strategic 
effects of anti-social personality during trust, reciprocity and punishment strongly supports the 
notion that self-projection underlies anti-social decision-making. 
 
JEL: C71, D87, D91 
Keywords: trust, reciprocity, punishment, anti-social, personality, individual differences  
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Introduction 
Previous research has uncovered the presence of substantial heterogeneity in social preferences 
that include for instance reciprocal fairness (Falk and Fischbacher, 1999), inequity aversion 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and altruism (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002), in addition to purely 
selfish and even spiteful behavioral tendencies (Falk et al., 2000). A key question that remains 
unanswered to date concerns the sources that generate such heterogeneity in social preferences. 
Understanding the origins of such heterogeneity can provide important insights into the 
mechanisms that drive choices, assist in developing better models for predicting behavior 
within specific environments and has important implications for policy analysis (e.g., 
Heckman, 2001; Dohmen et al., 2008). Here, we integrate approaches from two disciplines to 
investigate the sources of individual differences in other-regarding preferences: Behavioral 
Economics and Personality Psychology. The intersection between Personality Psychology and 
Behavioral Economics has experienced emerging interest in the recent past (Capra et al., 2013; 
Becker et al., 2012; Borghans et al., 2008, Almlund et al., 2011, Ferguson et al., 2011, Zhao 
and Smilie, 2015). Personality traits measure the relatively enduring patterns of thoughts, 
emotions and behavior that reflect an individual’s propensity to respond in certain ways under 
specific circumstances (Roberts, 2009), thereby providing a set of coherent constructs that are 
complementary to economic preference measures (Becker et al., 2012). Personality traits could 
therefore help explain the complexities in manifestations of economic and social behavior 
(Ferguson et al., 2011). 
 
Results from several investigations that have employed this approach underline the notion that 
personality is an important factor that mediates the interplay between cognition and emotion in 
the production of behavior. Specifically, conscientiousness and emotional stability predict 
performance on tests commonly regarded as measuring purely cognitive abilities, such as 
intelligence (Borghans et al., 2008) and academic achievement (Cunha and Heckman, 2008; 
Cunha et al., 2010). Further evidence suggests that personality has a specific impact on 
performance by modulating achievement motivation, which, in turn, affects effort (Borghans et 
al., 2008; Segal, 2008). Relatedly, individuals who differ in their personality characteristics also 
differ with respect to their risk attitude (Becker et al, 2012; Capra et al., 2013), likely by 
modulating incentive motivation for obtaining large rewards (Capra et al., 2012; Engelmann et 
al., 2009; Pothos et al., 2011). In the social domain, a link between the Big Five personality 
traits and trust, as well as reciprocity has been established (Dohmen et al., 2008; Becker et al., 
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2012). Specifically, in experimental settings (Dohmen et al., 2008) and large representative 
samples (Becker et al., 2012), both conscientiousness and emotional reactivity were negatively 
associated with the propensity to trust. Given that the data on the relationship between 
personality and social preferences are largely descriptive at this point, the question about the 
sources of the individual differences in social preferences remains unanswered. The main goal 
of the present investigation therefore was to probe measures of specific personality 
characteristics related to anti-social behavioral tendencies to help identify the underlying 
mechanisms that lead to strategic behavior in social choice settings. 
 
The approach we take here advances prior investigations of the heterogeneity in social 
preferences in multiple ways: First, we focus on personality-environment interactions to 
identify individual differences in the strategies people deploy to solve social dilemmas. As 
implied by standard definitions of personality (Roberts, 2009), the behavioral tendencies 
assessed in personality questionnaires strongly depend on environmental factors. To give an 
example, extroversion is typically assessed in social situations (“I enjoy being the center of 
attention at a party”), while emotional reactivity expresses itself in the presence of emotional 
challenges, such as stress (“When I am very stressed, …”). Clearly, behavior is not consistent 
across situations (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Roberts, 2009; Fergusen et al., 2011) and such 
behavioral plasticity across contexts is an important factor that contributes to human and animal 
fitness (Dingemanse et al., 2009). Dominant theories incorporate behavioral plasticity into the 
way they conceptualize personality, such as the cognitive-affective personality systems theory 
(Mischel & Shoda, 1995) and, more recently, the socio-genomic framework of personality 
(Roberts, 2009). Cross-situational variability is particularly relevant for social traits, as social 
environments are inherently complex and dynamic, such that social dilemmas can be solved via 
multiple approaches that are highly context dependent. Therefore, to identify the strategic 
nature underlying social decision-making, we manipulate the environment within which social 
decisions are made in the context of a well-formulated game-theoretic setting, the trust game. 
Specifically, to investigate the interplay of environmental changes with personality in a 
standard trust game setting, we allowed the investor to sanction the trustee on a subset of trials. 
We expected all subjects to adjust their behavior in the punishment environment relative to the 
sanction-free environment. Importantly, we ask whether specific personality characteristics are 
associated with an enhanced magnitude of this change in behavior above and beyond a mean 
change, such that there are specific personality variables that predict a greater adjustment of 
behavior due to the punishment environment.  
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A second factor that advances prior investigations of the heterogeneity in social preferences is 
our focus on measures of anti- and pro-sociality to test hypotheses about strategic interactions 
in social dilemmas. Prior investigations of the interplay between personality and economic 
preferences focused almost exclusively on broad dimensions of personality, such as the big five 
(e.g., Borghans et al., 2008, Beckers et al., 2011). More specific personality traits, such as 
Machiavellianism, have been relatively understudied (Ferguson et al., 2011). To address this 
gap in the literature and to test specific hypotheses about the sources of individual differences 
in social preferences, we focused on personality characteristics that assess pro- and anti-social 
behavioral tendencies, such as trustworthiness and Machiavellianism. Rather than being merely 
reactive, anti-social traits are assumed to induce proactive behavior that is characterized by 
anticipating future outcomes and taking action before situations become a source of 
confrontation (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006). Based on these results, we expected strategic, payoff-
maximizing choice behavior of people with anti-social characteristics in the context of 
anonymous one-shot trust game interactions with and without the option to punish low trustee 
reciprocity. More specifically, payoff-maximizing behavior of the investor (the first mover) 
would be revealed by an increased investment propensity when given the option to punish and 
concurrently expectations of higher returns from the trustee. Similarly, payoff-maximizing 
behavior of the trustee (the second mover) would be revealed by lower reciprocity levels in the 
absence of punishment and increased reciprocity in its presence, to avoid possible sanctions by 
the investor within the punishment environment. 
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Methods 
 
Participants. 182 volunteers (98 females, 84 males; mean age (SD) 22.7 (3.9) years) from 
various Universities in Zurich participated in the current study. Students with a background in 
Economics and Psychology were excluded from the experiment to avoid potential decision 
biases. Participants gave written and informed consent to procedures approved by the local 
ethics committee (Zurich, Switzerland). No deception was used throughout all procedures 
employed in the current experiment. Three participants were removed from further analyses 
due to technical problems (1) and because personality scores identified them as clear outliers 
(2), leading to a final sample size of N = 179. 
 
Procedure. The experimental procedure was as follows: First, participants filled out an online 
battery of personality questionnaires some days (mean (SD): 5.0 (3.2) days) before the 
experiment. Second, they were invited to the UZH laboratory where the experiment was 
conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were randomly assigned to the role 
of either the investor (P1; N = 90) or trustee (P2; N = 89) and never switched roles for the length 
of the entire experiment. After each trial, all players were randomly matched with anonymous 
counterparts. In total, there were 13 sessions with 8 to 20 subjects per session, each containing 
4 within-subject treatments in counterbalanced order. All treatments were repeated 6 times. 
Feedback and payout occurred at the end of the session, preventing the emergence of social 
history and wealth effects. Payoff structure and game setup were common-knowledge. Subjects 
earned 20 CHF (1 CHF = 1.05 US$) for completing the online questionnaires and received 
additional payouts for one randomly selected trial from the trust and risk games 
 
Experimental Design. To test specific hypotheses about the influence of personality on social 
preferences, four different versions of the trust game were administered to all participants in 
counterbalanced order: the NPT (no punishment treatment) and PT (punishment treatment) 
were identical binary trust games, except that investors had the option to punish in the PT. This 
allowed us to identify the effect of personality on decisions to invest and reciprocate in different 
punishment environments. Two additional control games were included to ensure the 
robustness and ecological validity of our results via the NBT (non-binary treatment) and to 
identify the effects of emotional arousal via the DT (direct feedback treatment). In all versions 
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of the trust game, two players, player 1 (P1), the investor, and player 2 (P2), the trustee, were 
first endowed with 20 CHF and then sequentially exchanged money as shown in Fig. 1. 
Stage 1: P1 moves first and decides in a binary choice situation whether to send nothing to P2 
and keep the 20 CHF endowment, in which case the current round ends and both players keep 
their 20 CHF, or whether to transfer (T = trust amount) 10 CHF to P2. If P1 decides to send 
money, this amount is tripled leading to a wealth distribution of 10 CHF for P1 and 50 CHF for 
P2 at the beginning of stage 2. 
To assess the strategic nature of investment changes due to the option to punish, we also 
measured the investor’s belief about the trustee's back-transfer throughout each version of the 
trust game. Beliefs of the investor were measured after each investment decision as follows: (1) 
In all games P1 states his belief about how much he thinks P2 will back-transfer immediately 
after the transfer decision; (2) in the PT, P1 also states his belief about how much he thinks that 
P2 has transferred back immediately after the decision to punish. 
Stage 2: P2 decides how much to transfer back to P1 (BT = back-transfer amount) conditional 
on P1’s initial transfer (i.e. 0 CHF or 10 CHF). If P1 chose to invest CHF 10, the choice menu 
of potential back-transfer amounts ranges from 0 CHF and 50 CHF in 5 CHF increments, if P1 
invested nothing, P2’s choice menu of potential back-transfer amounts ranges from 0 CHF and 
20 CHF. The latter option was included to test for altruistic giving, which occurred on very few 
occasions. P2 chooses via the strategy method (contingent decisions for all possible transfer 
amounts from P1; Brandts & Charness, 2011). In each round, the choice is binding, provided 
that the relevant option has actually been chosen by P1. In the simplest version of the trust game 
we employed here, the game ends after stage 2, such that final endowments are (20 – T + BT) 
CHF for P1 and (20 + 3*T – BT) CHF for P2. The purpose of this treatment was to assess the 
baseline willingness to trust for P1 and to reciprocate for P2, as it did not include the option to 
punish. 
Stage 3: To identify which personality characteristics were specifically sensitive to unfair 
behavior in our P1s and the option to be punished in our sample of P2s, we included a version 
of the trust game in which P1s had the option to punish P2s (PT). Specifically, while the first 
two stages of this version of the trust game were equivalent to the NPT, as shown in Fig. 1, we 
included a third stage, in which P1 chooses via the strategy method what amount (P = 
punishment amount) he or she will spend to reduce P2’s payoff. For each CHF invested by P1, 
5 CHF will be deducted from P2. This creates an equal balance of power in the PT, such that if 
P2 would back-transfer 0 CHF and P1 spends his remaining 10 CHF to punish P2, both players 
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would end up with a final payoff of 0 CHF. Note that P2’s final payoff is prevented from being 
negative, even if P1’s punishment amount (P * 5) is greater than P2’s current holdings. 
In our analyses, we focus on the differences in behavior between the PT and NPT, in order to 
identify an environment-induced behavioral change and, importantly, whether specific 
personality characteristics predict an enhanced magnitude of this change in behavior above and 
beyond a mean change. Results from additional trust games that were employed as robustness 
checks are reported in SI section S1 for the non-binary game (NBT) and SI section S3 for the 
direct feedback (DT) game. Of note, the order of three trust games without any feedback 
information (NPT, PT, NBT) was counterbalanced and presentation order was included as a 
control variable in all regression analyses. Because feedback about the other players’ transfer 
and back-transfer amounts were provided during the DT, this game was always presented last 
to avoid social history and wealth effects. 
 
[Insert Fig. 1] 
 
Risk Tasks. After completion of the trust games, a subset of 104 participants made risky 
decisions in the context of a certainty equivalent task. The task consisted of a total of 126 
individual decisions, in which each choice scenario offered an alternative between choosing a 
probabilistic lottery and a sure amount. The lottery offered one potential payoff that is greater 
than the sure amount, and one that is smaller. The payout was determined by randomly selecting 
1 of the 126 choice scenarios for which participants earned additional cash amounts between 0 
and 50 CHF. For the remainder of subjects (N = 78), risk attitude was assessed via a series of 6 
choices between a lottery (same in all trials: 50% chance of winning either 10 CHF or 0.5 CHF) 
and increasing amounts of safe payments (increasing from 2 CHF to 7.5 CHF). The switch 
point, reflective of the certainty equivalent in this choice scenario, is taken as a measure of risk 
attitude. The payout was determined by randomly selecting one of the 6 lotteries for which 
participants earned additional cash amounts between 0.5 CHF and 10 CHF. Detailed results 
assessing the relationship between risk and trust, which has been a recurring concern in the 
literature (Houser, Schunk & Winter, 2010; Altmann, Dohmen & Wibral, 2008) are reported in 
SI section S4. 
 
Psychological Questionnaires. We assessed personality traits that we hypothesized to have an 
impact on trust and reciprocity, using well-established psychological questionnaires. 
Specifically, we included measures of (1) anti- and pro-sociality, (2) impulsivity, (3) emotional 
reactivity and (4) the big 5 (neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and 
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conscientiousness, assessed via the NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 2006). Measures of anti- and 
pro-social behavioral tendencies included (a) the 27-item PNR scale (Personal Norm of 
Reciprocity; Perugini et al., 2003) that assesses individuals’ propensity for positive and 
negative reciprocity, as well as subjects’ belief in reciprocity; (b) the 25-item MACH-IV 
questionnaire (Machiavellianism Inventory; Allsopp et al., 1991) that measures strategic, anti-
social and selfish behavioral tendencies; (c) the 16-item SDS (Social Desirability Scale; Stöber, 
1999) that assesses individual tendencies to act in a socially desirable manner; (d) the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1983) that assesses various aspects related to 
empathy, such as perspective-taking ability, the tendency to identify with fictional characters, 
empathic concern and personal distress; (e) the 28-item PTS questionnaire (Propensity to Trust 
Scale; Evans & Revelle, 2008) that measures willingness to trust and trustworthiness; (f) the 
38-item ECR questionnaire (Experiences in Close Relationships; Ehrenthal et al., 2009) that 
assesses the tendency to be anxious about and avoid close relationships. Measures of impulsivity 
included (a) the 30-item BIS-11 (Barrat Impulsiveness Scale; Patton, Stanford & Barrat, 1995) 
that assesses ”attentional”, ”motor” and ”non-planning” impulsivity; and  (b) the 40-item SSSV 
(Sensation-Seeking Scale V; Zuckermann, 1994) that measures aspects of sensation seeking, 
such as thrill and adventure seeking, disinhibition, experience seeking and boredom 
susceptibility. Measures of emotional reactivity included (a) the 24-item STAXI (Intensity and 
Disposition to Experience State and Trait Anger; Spielberger, 2010) that measures the intensity 
and disposition to experience anger; (b) the 20-item STAI (a measure of state and trait anxiety; 
Spielberger, 2010) that assesses anxiety; (c) the 21-item BDI scale (Beck Depression Inventory; 
Beck et al., 1996) that measures depression severity; (d) the 24-item BIS/BAS (Behavioral 
Inhibition/Activation System; Carver & White, 1994) that measures the tendency to be 
motivated by appetitive and aversive behavioral outcomes. Finally, immediately after the 
behavioral tasks, subjects’ current mood state and perceived stress were assessed by the 12-
item MDBF questionnaire (Steyer et al., 1997) that measures current mood, arousal and anxiety 
state, and the 10-item PSS (Perceived Stress Scale; Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983) 
that measures the perception of stress and the degree to which situations in one’s current life 
are appraised as stressful. 
 
Results 
 
Factor Analysis. Given the high dimensionality of our personality data, we first employed 
factor analysis to reduce the data to the most essential elements and remove sources of 
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covariance before entering this data into regression analysis. This method has three distinct 
advantages for the current investigation: (1) It removes potential redundancies by identifying 
the essential elements in the questionnaire data that are important for further analysis of the 
influence of personality on decision making in changing environments; (2) it creates a set of 
uncorrelated factors that explain the unique contribution of specific personality factors to social 
decision-making, and (3) it reduces noise due to measurement inaccuracies by producing new 
variables from redundant items. An exploratory factor analysis using maximum likelihood 
estimation with orthogonal varimax rotation in Stata 14.2 was conducted for the 37 
questionnaire items* and 5 factors were retained, indicated jointly by the scree-plot and the 
latent-root-criterion. Factor loadings reported in table 1 can be interpreted as correlations 
between factors and the corresponding item, with a higher loading making the item more 
representative of the factor. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Table 1 shows a well interpretable and sensible factor structure suggesting the following 
classification of the retained 5 factors: (1) The emotional reactivity (EMO) factor shows high 
positive loadings on subscales reflective of high levels of emotional reactivity, such as trait 
anxiety, depression and neuroticism, as well as anger suppression and anxiety about close 
relationships and negative loadings on extroversion and trust; (2) the anti-sociality (ANTI) 
factor shows high positive loadings on anti-social subscales reflective of Machiavellianism, 
financial and ethical risk taking (DOSPERT) and avoidance of relationships, as well as high 
negative loadings on pro-social subscales reflective of trustworthiness, empathic concern, and 
agreeableness; (3) the sensation seeking (SS) factor shows high positive loadings on all 
subscales related to sensation seeking (SSS-V), such as disinhibition, boredom susceptibility, 
experience seeking and especially thrill and adventure seeking, as well as health and 
recreational risk taking (DOSPERT), (4) the anger (ANG) factor shows high positive loadings 
on subscales reflective of trait anger, aggressive behavior and negative reciprocity, as well as 
high negative loadings on anger control and social desirability; (5) the impulsivity (IMP) factor 
shows high positive loadings on all measures of impulsivity (BIS-11), such as attentional and 
motor, but especially non-planning impulsiveness and high negative loadings on 
conscientiousness, reward responsiveness and goal oriented behavior. To construct the five 
                                                 
* Items measuring state variables, such as state anger, state anxiety, perceived stress and current mood were not 
included in the factor analysis. The following subscales were not included as they exhibit low KMO (Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy) and lead to decreasing Cronbach’s alpha (internal consistency) 
measures: NEO-FFI openness, BAS fun-seeking and PNR belief. 
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compound personality variables for subsequent analyses, factor scores for the latent variables 
were computed using Bartlett’s approach, producing normalized and unbiased maximum 
likelihood estimates of the ”true” factor scores for each participant (e.g. Costello & Osborne, 
2005; Hayton, Allen & Scarpello, 2004). 
 
Our main research goal was to assess the extent to which personality factors predict the 
influence of punishment on (1) trust, as reflected by investor decisions to transfer money to 
another anonymous player, (2) reciprocity, as reflected by the trustee’s decision to reciprocate, 
and (3) punishment propensity, as reflected in the investor’s decision to invest money in 
reducing the trustee’s final payout. We addressed these research questions by investigating the 
association between personality factors and choice behavior at each stage of the trust game, by 
first analyzing (1) P1’s trust, then (2) P2’s reciprocity and finally, (3) P1’s punishment behavior.  
 
Stage 1: Trust. We performed multiple Logit regressions estimating the association between 
personality and trust in the presence and absence of punishment to address the following 
questions: What is the general influence of personality on the investor’s decision to trust? Does 
the option to punish trust betrayal influence the investor’s propensity to trust? To what degree 
does personality affect the magnitude of the impact of the option to punish on trust? We 
modeled the influence of punishment on trust via the dummy variable PT (punishment present 
(1), absent (0)). In addition, our models included a number of socio-economic control 
variables † , namely Sex (male/female), City (reflective of living in a city with > 10'000 
inhabitants), Swiss (reflective of cultural background) and Age, as well as controls for mood 
(MDBF) and stress level (PSS) that were measured at the time of the experiment. Our results 
are not dependent on these a priori confounders, as all results hold without these control 
variables‡. To account for the panel structure (within-subject design in which each individual 
played six rounds in each treatment)§, cluster-robust standard errors were calculated. 
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients for three different models: Model 1 only contains 
socio-economic control variables, as well as PSS and MDBF scores and the treatment dummy 
PT. Model 2 adds the five personality variables, and model 3 additionally its interactions with 
                                                 
† Note: Game-specific control variables, such as treatment-order dummies, round-one dummy and session size 
were included in all our models but are not reported in the tables. 
‡ In most cases, effects of confounders are not significantly different from zero, thus are not reported in the tables. 
§ As proposed by Barr (2013) when testing interaction effects with multiple observations per unit, mixed-effects 
models with random intercept and slope (for the within-subject treatment effect PT) coefficients were tested for 
both game stages, but qualitative results did not change.  
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the treatment environment, which are of particular importance to the current research question 
as interactions address whether personality predicts the magnitude of the effect that the option 
to punish has on trust beyond its mean effect. The following discussion will focus on the results 
from model 3, because this model yielded the lowest corrected AIC value (AICc; Wagenmakers 
& Farrell, 2004) and our research questions focus on the interaction terms. 
 
[Insert Table 2, Fig. 2] 
 
On average, P1s armed with the option to punish P2s exhibited a 15 percentage points increase 
in their probability to transfer 10 CHF (p < 0.01; Mean transfer probability PT: 74.3%; NPT: 
60.7%). Conversely, higher ANG factor scores led to a significantly lower transfer probability 
(if ANG factor scores would increase by 1 unit, this probability decreases by 8 percentage 
points). The same magnitude was observed for the ANTI factor, however showing only 
marginal significance (p < 0.1). Notably, an interaction between anti-sociality and the option to 
punish was observed. As shown in Fig. 2A, this interaction indicates that the relationship 
between the propensity to trust and anti-sociality changes in the presence compared to the 
absence of punishment. Specifically, participants with high ANTI factor scores demonstrated a 
significantly increased transfer probability in the punishment relative to the no-punishment 
environment (p < 0.01). As reported in Table 2 and illustrated in Fig. 2, no other personality 
factor (apart from anger, which also showed a significant, but much less substantial marginal 
probability effect) significantly interacts with the punishment environment. 
 
Such shifts in behavior are likely of a strategic nature, in that the punishment option may lead 
to enhanced back-transfer expectations in subjects with higher anti-sociality, but not in others. 
Increasing “trust” under such beliefs would be strategically optimal as it is expected to generate 
greater payouts. To test this notion, we assessed (1) whether specifically anti-sociality and no 
other personality factor is associated with greater earnings in the trust game, and (2) the change 
in investors’ beliefs about how much they think their counterparts will back-transfer in the 
presence compared to the absence of punishment. We find that anti-sociality is significantly 
and positively associated with higher potential earnings. Specifically, we find an average 
increase in potential earnings of 2.10 CHF in the absence of punishment (p < 0.001) and of 1.25 
CHF in the presence of punishment (p < 0.05). This positive association was not observed for 
any other personality factor (NPT: all p > 0.246, PT: all p > 0.083).  
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Beliefs about backtransfers are shown in Table 3 and illustrated in Fig. 3. These results 
demonstrate a significant and positive association between expectations of back-transfer 
amounts and anti-sociality in the presence relative to the absence of punishment (p < 0.01). This 
result supports the hypothesis that investors with greater anti-sociality act more strategically, 
as they adjust their investment behavior based on their increased back-transfer expectations 
when given the option to punish subsequent digressions. Similar results were obtained for the 
ANG factor, except that anger did not significantly interact with the punishment treatment. 
Given that no other personality factor showed this relationship, the strategic expectation-based 
nature of investment changes due to the option to punish is therefore specific to anti-social 
personality characteristics. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
 
Stage 2: Trustworthiness. We performed multiple OLS regression** estimating the association 
between personality and back-transfers in the presence and absence of punishment (similar 
procedure as in stage 1) to address the following questions: What is the influence of personality 
on the trustee’s decision to reciprocate and does the option to punish influence the trustee’s 
reciprocation? To what degree does personality affect the magnitude of the punishment effect 
on reciprocity? First, we identified an association between anti-sociality and back-transfer 
amounts, such that greater anti-sociality was associated with lower average back-transfer 
amounts (p < 0.01, this effect was reproduced when considering back-transfers in the non-
binary setting, see Fig. S1B and Table S2). Next, we focused on the impact of the investors’ 
option to punish trustees (modeled via the dummy variable PT) on the association between 
back-transfer and personality. Table 4 shows that the possibility of being punished by the 
investor increased trustee back-transfers by 3.50 CHF on average (mean back-transfer PT: 
14.81 CHF, NPT: 11.30 CHF, pdelta < 0.01). Furthermore, higher anti-sociality (ANTI) and anger 
(ANG) factor scores led to a significantly lower back-transfer on average (ANTI: p < 0.01; 
ANG: p < 0.05). Of note, a significant interaction between anti-sociality and the presence of 
punishment was observed, indicating that the degree of a person’s anti-sociality affects the 
magnitude of the change in reciprocal behavior in the presence compared to the absence of the 
                                                 
** We used the strategy method to record responses from trustees, obtaining back-transfer rates for two potential 
scenarios, namely for the case in which the investor sent 0 CHF and 10 CHF. The former was included to test pro-
social motives, such as altruism, which we did not observe (an average of a mere 0.5 CHF was returned when P1 
sent 0 CHF). We therefore focused on the case in which P1’s initial transfer had been 10 CHF. 
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investor’s option to punish (p < 0.05). Specifically, the greater the anti-sociality, the greater 
was the discrepancy between relatively low back-transfers when P1 could not punish and 
relatively higher back-transfers when P1 was able to do so (Fig. 4). Such shifts in back-transfer 
amounts in the punishment environment are likely of a strategic nature, such that subjects with 
higher anti-sociality scores may anticipate greater emotional discontent and subsequent 
punishment from investors who face low back-transfers. Indeed, as we show below, anti-social 
characteristics are associated with significantly stricter punishment of digressions (Fig. 5A). 
Under conditions of heightened expectations to be punished, sending back higher monetary 
amounts is payoff maximizing. One common mechanism to form expectations about the 
behavior of counterparts in social interactions is self-projection (e.g., Silani et al., 2013), 
particularly in the absence of relevant information about other players, as is the case in the 
anonymous one-shot trust games played in the current experiment. We therefore investigated 
the relationship between anti-sociality and punishment as a proxy for the expectation to get 
punished. Specifically, demonstrating that anti-social characteristics are associated with greater 
punishment of deviations from expectations is consistent with the notion that anti-social 
personality characteristics lead to greater back-transfer amounts via an accurate self-projection 
mechanism. 
 
[Insert Table 4, Fig. 4] 
 
Stage 3: Punishment. To what degree does the willingness to punish depend on personality? 
Furthermore, is the relationship between back-transfer amount and costly punishment 
magnitude affected by personality? To answer these questions, we first assessed the average 
relationship between back-transfer amounts and punishment, given that P1’s initial transfer had 
been 10 CHF††. To capture the non-linear, negative exponential relationship between back-
transfer and punishment amounts, we adapted models typically employed to explain 
intertemporal choice behavior (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Laibson, 1997; see SI Equations S8-
S12). This specification allows the slope parameters of the exponential function to change for 
different back-transfer domains, as further discussed below. Model comparison revealed that a 
quasi-hyperbolic, double-exponential functional model best fits the data (Equation S11; Figure 
S2; for model comparison see Table S3). We found the expected relationship between back-
transfer amount and punishment magnitude, such that subjects punish very low back-transfers 
more severely than back-transfers around a point of perceived fairness (at 25 CHF as estimated 
                                                 
†† P1s that have transferred 0 CHF in the first stage did not expect positive back-transfer amounts and also did not 
spend substantial amounts to punish P2s, independent of back-transfer amounts. 
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via piecewise OLS; Equation S7; Fig. S2). Specifically, as reported in Table 5, there is a decline 
in average punishment until the point of perceived fairness, reflected by the negative slope 
coefficients BT1 and BT2 (both p < 0.05), and little average punishment after this point (this 
effect is further pronounced by BT2 being less negative than BT1; pDelta < 0.01‡‡). All models 
were estimated via non-linear least squares regression. Model comparison was conducted via 
Akaike weights based on corrected AIC (Table S3; Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004). 
Next, we answered the question whether personality predicts the severity of punishment (Table 
5 and Fig. 5). We found that subjects with high anti-social characteristics exhibited the strongest 
punishment response to trustee (P2) defection, as indicated by a significant positive effect of 
anti-sociality on the intercept (p < 0.01), followed by a strong average decline in punishment 
amounts as back-transfers increased, especially in the low back-transfer domain, as indicated 
by the negative slope effect (ANTI x BT2; p < 0.05) of anti-sociality interacted with back-
transfer. Specifically, anti-sociality was associated with significant increases in punishment of 
low back-transfers: For zero back-transfers, a unit increase in the ANTI factor score led to an 
increase in punishment amount by 1.98 CHF on average (see Equation S13 for the marginal 
effect of the ANTI factor). This gap became smaller with higher back-transfers and finally 
disappeared after a back-transfer of about 25 CHF. Furthermore, impulsivity was also 
associated with significantly higher punishment of defection, but showing only half of the 
magnitude compared to anti-sociality (marginal effect of the IMP factor at zero back-transfer 
= 0.95 CHF; p < 0.05). Finally, a higher EMO factor score diminished the response function 
slope, leading to a reduced punishments of low back-transfer amounts (p < 0.05). 
 
[Insert Table 5: Fig. 5] 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
‡‡ Slope coefficients in this model have to be interpreted relative to the slope coefficient BT1 in the exponential 
model; see Equation S8 and Kable & Glimcher, 2007 
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Discussion 
 
The main goal of the current investigation was to assess the role of specific personality traits in 
explaining heterogeneity in social preferences. Specifically, we hypothesized that anti- and pro-
social characteristics interact with environmental challenges in the production of social 
behavior. Through independent self-report measures, we first identified a personality profile 
that clearly reflects anti-social personality characteristics, with high positive loadings on 
Machiavellianism and high negative loadings on empathy, trustworthiness and agreeableness. 
When looking at the role of personality in the context of a standard trust game without 
punishment, anti-sociality predicts decision strategies in a manner that is consistent with its 
name: significantly lower levels of trust and decreased trustworthiness.  
To identify the strategic nature of anti-social behavior in changing environments, we assessed 
the interaction between personality and environmental changes on investor and trustee decision-
making in the context of trust games with and without punishment. Simply the knowledge that 
the investor can sanction the trustee leads to significant increases in investor trust and trustee 
reciprocity across all subjects. Anti-social personality characteristics predict the magnitude of 
this environmental effect above and beyond a mean effect. Specifically, greater anti-sociality is 
associated with significant increases in trust taking and reciprocity within the punishment 
environment. No other personality factor was predictive of such a strong adjustment of decision 
strategies in the presence of punishment. Taken together, these results demonstrate that anti-
social personality characteristics are associated with strategic behavioral shifts aimed at 
maximizing the extraction of resources from their counterparts in the context of social 
dilemmas. This strategy was successful, as anti-sociality, but no other personality factor, was 
associated with greater earnings. 
Our results also inform the mechanisms underlying the shifts in choice strategy associated with 
anti-sociality. Specifically, we show that anti-sociality is associated with significant changes of 
investors’ beliefs in changing environments. Importantly, such shift in beliefs across 
punishment conditions was specific for anti-sociality and was not observed for any other 
personality factors. These results indicate that one mechanism through which anti-sociality 
affects decision strategies is through a belief structure that is significantly more context-
dependent compared to other personality factors. 
The question arises what psychological mechanism underlies the context-dependent decision 
strategies and belief structure of anti-social investors and trustees. The surprising finding that 
exclusively anti-sociality is associated with specific changes in decision strategies in the 
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punishment context across all three stages of the trust game implies the following: (1) the 
significant increase in trust that is specific to anti-social investors reflects an accurate prediction 
about the increase in back-transfer amounts under conditions of punishment; (2) this is 
paralleled by the significantly more optimistic expectations about trustee back-transfer amounts 
under conditions of punishment, particularly for anti-social investors; and (3) trustees with high 
levels of anti-sociality accurately predict the severe punishment of low back-transfers by 
investors with high levels of anti-sociality. The significant changes in trust and beliefs across 
punishment environments displayed by anti-social investors and trustees are therefore optimally 
tailored for interactions with other anti-social types as they accurately predict the behaviour of 
their anti-social interaction partners. Together, these observations are consistent with the notion 
that decision strategies and beliefs of persons with high trait levels of anti-sociality are based 
on self-projection, which is the process of simulating one’s own thoughts, feelings and 
intentions within a hypothetical scenario to make predictions about the behavior of others 
(Waytz & Mitchell, 2011). To give an example, to estimate the likelihood of betrayal (Bohnet 
and Zeckhauser, 2004; Aimone et al., 2014) investors might simulate how they would act if 
they were in the role of the trustee, while trustees might simulate how they would react to low 
back-transfer amounts to estimate the likelihood of retaliation. In the context of anonymous 
one-shot trust games in which no further identifying information about counterparts is provided, 
self-projection may be an important and adaptive process, especially if the motivation of the 
player is to maximize payoffs.  
The behavioral profile outlined above agrees with predictions made about anti-social 
personality characteristics in the clinical literature. Anti-social types show a good 
understanding of the intentions and emotions of others by anticipating behavior under different 
settings (Whiten & Byrne, 1997), while at the same time showing deficits in empathizing 
abilities in social interrelations (Lyons, Caldwell & Schultz, 2010). Self-projection is one 
plausible mechanism that can enable such exploitative strategies in the competition for 
resources observed in anti-social types, as it can lead to egocentricity bias (e.g., Silani et al., 
2013) and lack of empathy, particularly in the case of a person with payoff maximizing motives. 
In the current study, we were able to predict such strategic behavioral tendencies in the context 
of a trust game from assessments using standard personality questionnaires in a psychologically 
normal student population. 
Our results provide an important empirical step in developing an economic theory of anti-social 
behavior. First, they show that specific personality factors can modulate choice strategies across 
different environments. Specifically, anti-sociality is associated with a flexible behavioral 
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response to different economic environments. Our evidence suggests that such behavioral 
plasticity is employed by persons with high levels of anti-sociality whose motive it is to 
maximize payoffs by extracting resources from other players. No other personality profile 
showed similar levels of behavioral plasticity in the context of the social interactions captured 
by the trust games employed in the current study, indicating the specificity of context-
dependent decision strategies for anti-sociality.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that our research approach provides a number of methodological 
advances that may be important for future research at the intersection between Personality 
Psychology and Behavioral Economics. As suggested by dominant theories of personality and 
captured by a recent economic framework (Almlund et al., 2012), behaviors can change across 
situational contexts. Context gains additional relevance when it comes to social decision 
strategies, as social interactions are inherently complex and highly context-dependent. 
Therefore, clearly conceptualized environmental manipulations are important for 
understanding individual differences in choice strategies and to identify the role of personality 
in decision-making in general. Our results therefore suggest that future research should adapt 
the approach taken in the current investigation and manipulate contexts relevant for the choice 
strategies under investigation, as otherwise important associations between personality and 
economic behavior across situations may not be identifiable. 
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Table 1: Results from an exploratory factor analysis of 37 personality questionnaire items included in the online 
questionnaire. Five factors can be identified that are reflective of emotional reactivity (EMO factor), anti-sociality 
(ANTI factor), sensation seeking (SS factor), trait anger (ANG factor), and impulsivity (IMP factor). The factor 
analysis was conducted by maximum likelihood estimation with orthogonal varimax rotation (Kaiser 
normalization). Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.82. Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.83. LR test: 5 
factors vs. saturated: Prob. < 0.00. Variance explained: 48.8 %. Number of Subjects: 179. Subject-to-Item ratio: 
4.8. Blanks: |loading| < 0.35. Bold: |loading| > 0.5. 
 
Item EMO Factor ANTI Factor SS Factor ANG Factor IMP Factor Uniqueness 
PTS TRUST -0.5588 -0.4567    0.4584 
PTS TRUSTWT  -0.5778  -0.3931  0.3202 
SDS    -0.5283  0.5072 
MACH IV  0.6192    0.4869 
IRI PT  -0.3939    0.6584 
IRI FS  -0.3786    0.7961 
IRI EC  -0.7730    0.3939 
IRI PD 0.6113     0.5432 
STAI T 0.8959     0.1580 
STAXI T 0.3826   0.6664  0.3723 
STAXI AO    0.6797  0.5210 
STAXI AC    -0.5637  0.6214 
STAXI AI 0.5889     0.6170 
BIS BI 0.6612     0.3824 
BAS DRIVE     -0.6119 0.5554 
BAS REWARD  -0.4048   -0.4219 0.6204 
BIS 11 AT 0.3667    0.3928 0.5584 
BIS 11 MT   0.4777  0.4437 0.5325 
BIS 11 NP     0.6291 0.4604 
DOSPERT ET  0.4662  0.3818  0.5047 
DOSPERT FI  0.4768    0.6948 
DOSPERT HE   0.5738   0.6177 
DOSPERT RE   0.8652   0.2128 
DOSPERT SP   0.4074   0.7991 
PNR POS  -0.4502    0.7257 
PNR NEG    0.4868  0.5845 
NEO NR 0.8402     0.2246 
NEO EX -0.5432 -0.3907    0.4884 
NEO AG  -0.6948  -0.4049  0.3144 
NEO CN     -0.7151 0.3663 
ECR BANXIETY 0.5878     0.6280 
ECR BAVOIDANCE  0.5326    0.6686 
BDI 0.6974     0.4237 
SSSV TA   0.8256   0.2047 
SSSV DI   0.5184   0.6364 
SSSV EX   0.5373   0.6463 
SSSV BD  0.3589 0.4437   0.6359 
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Table 2: Logit regressions investigating the effect of personality on investor decisions to trust (T) in the presence 
compared to the absence of the option to punish. The dependent variable in all columns is the investor’s decision 
to trust. PT is a dummy variable reflective of the option to punish. To assess the influence of personality on trust, 
all five factors were included in the model, including emotional reactivity (EMO), anti-sociality (ANTI), sensation 
seeking (SS), trait anger (ANG), and impulsivity (IMP). Differential effects of personality in the presence 
compared to the absence of punishment were modeled by interacting all personality factors with the dummy 
variable reflective of the presence of punishment (factor x PT). Constant, treatment-order dummies, round-one 
dummy, session size, sex, city, Swiss, age, MDBF and PSS are not reported in the table. Results from model 3 are 
reported in the main paper. Marginal interaction effects were derived by calculating the discrete differences with 
respect to the dummy variable PT of the single derivatives with respect to the continuous factor variables (Norton, 
Wang & Ai, 2004). All covariates were fixed at their means. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%. 
 
Model 1 2 3 3 
Variable Coef. / (SE) Coef. / (SE) Coef. / (SE) dy/dx / (SE) 
PT 0.665*** 0.696*** 0.716*** 0.15*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.03) 
EMO Factor - 0.141 0.190 0.04 
  (0.21) (0.23) (0.05) 
ANTI Factor - -0.120 -0.379* -0.08* 
  (0.20) (0.22) (0.05) 
SS Factor - 0.267 0.205 0.04 
  (0.17) (0.18) (0.04) 
ANG Factor - -0.267 -0.389** -0.08** 
  (0.17) (0.18) (0.04) 
IMP Factor - 0.145 0.058 0.02 
  (0.17) (0.18) (0.04) 
EMO x PT - - -0.083 -0.03 
   (0.16) (0.04) 
ANTI x PT - - 0.546*** 0.12*** 
   (0.19) (0.04) 
SS x PT - - 0.178 0.02 
   (0.13) (0.03) 
ANG x PT - - 0.236 0.06** 
   (0.15) (0.03) 
IMP x PT - - 0.148 0.02 
   (0.18) (0.04) 
N (# Clusters) 1080 (90) 1080 (90) 1080 (90)  
AICc 1300 1264 1257  
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.10 0.12  
Prob. > X2 0.00 0.00 0.00  
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Table 3: OLS regressions investigating the effect of personality on investors’ beliefs in the presence compared to 
the absence of the option to punish. The dependent variable in all columns is P1's belief about P2's back transfer. 
PT is a dummy variable reflective of the option to punish. Differential effects of personality in the presence 
compared to the absence of punishment were modeled by interacting all personality factors with the dummy 
variable reflective of the presence of punishment (factor x PT). Constant, treatment-order dummies, round-one 
dummy, session size, sex, city, Swiss, age, MDBF and PSS are not reported in the table. Significance levels: *** 
= 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%. 
 
Model 1 2 3 
Variable Coef. / (SE) Coef. / (SE) Coef. / (SE) 
PT 2.676*** 2.676*** 2.634*** 
 (0.60) (0.52) (0.52) 
EMO Factor - 0.041 0.636 
  (0.63) (0.67) 
ANTI Factor - -0.882 -1.913** 
  (0.80) (0.76) 
SS Factor - 0.954 0.721 
  (0.59) (0.64) 
ANG Factor - -1.631*** -2.022*** 
  (0.54) (0.59) 
IMP Factor - 0.358 0.419 
  (0.67) (0.67) 
EMO x PT - - -1.191** 
   (0.57) 
ANTI x PT - - 2.062*** 
   (0.60) 
SS x PT - - 0.466 
   (0.49) 
ANG x PT - - 0.783 
   (0.60) 
IMP x PT - - 0.121 
   (0.60) 
N (# Clusters) 1080 (90) 1080 (90) 1080 (90) 
AICc 7751 7700 7687 
R2 0.12 0.17 0.18 
Prob. > X2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 4: OLS regressions investigating the effect of personality on trustee back transfer (BT) decisions in the 
presence compared to the absence of the option to punish. The dependent variable in all columns is the trustee’s 
back transfer amount when the investor transferred 10 CHF. PT is a dummy variable reflective of the option to 
punish. To assess the influence of personality on reciprocity, all five factors were included in the model, including 
emotional reactivity (EMO), anti-sociality (ANTI), sensation seeking (SS), trait anger (ANG), and impulsivity 
(IMP). Differential effects of personality in the presence compared to the absence of punishment were modeled 
by interacting all personality factors with the dummy variable reflective of the presence of punishment (factor x 
PT). Constant, treatment-order dummies, round-one dummy, session size, sex, city, Swiss, age, MDBF and PSS 
are not reported in the table. Results from model 3 are reported in the main paper. Constant, treatment-order 
dummies, round-one dummy and session size are not reported in the table. Results from model 3 are reported in 
the main paper. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%. 
 
Model 1 2 3 
Variable Coef. / (SE) Coef. / (SE) Coef. / (SE) 
PT 3.511*** 3.511*** 3.458*** 
 (0.78) (0.79) (0.76) 
EMO Factor - 0.454 0.822 
  (0.85) (0.89) 
ANTI Factor - -1.772** -2.584*** 
  (0.68) (0.74) 
SS Factor - 0.491 0.321 
  (0.68) (0.80) 
ANG Factor - -1.493** -1.659** 
  (0.62) (0.71) 
IMP Factor - 0.612 1.205* 
  (0.49) (0.65) 
EMO x PT - - -0.736 
   (0.71) 
ANTI x PT - - 1.623** 
   (0.63) 
SS x PT - - 0.340 
   (0.79) 
ANG x PT - - 0.331 
   (0.65) 
IMP x PT - - -1.187 
   (0.73) 
N (# Clusters) 1068 (89) 1068 (89) 1068 (89) 
AICc 7568 7480 7465 
R2 0.10 0.18 0.20 
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 5: Non-linear regressions investigating the effect of personality on investor punishment behavior. The 
dependent variable in all columns is the amount invested to punish the trustee when the investor transferred 10 
CHF. Results from the three best models as identified by model comparison (see Table S3) are shown. The top 
three models are shown here, all of which have an exponential functional form. BT1 and BT2 are slope parameters 
reflective of a reduction in average punishment amounts invested as back-transfers increased. For the exponential 
model, there was one slope parameter BT1, whereas for the quasi-hyperbolic models (Kable & Glimcher, 2007) 
there were two: Given the more negative value of BT1 in the two quasi-hyperbolic models, BT1 reflects a special 
weight placed on lower back-transfers, whereas BT2 is reflective of higher back-transfers. Therefore, Table 5 
indicates that there is a change in estimated slope parameters, showing a more curved shape (compared to the 
exponential model) when back-transfers were lower. To assess the influence of personality on punishment, all five 
factors were included in the model, including emotional reactivity (EMO), anti-sociality (ANTI), sensation seeking 
(SS), trait anger (ANG), and impulsivity (IMP). Constant, treatment-order dummies, round-one dummy, session 
size, sex, city, Swiss, age, MDBF and PSS are not reported in the table. Results from model 3 are discussed in the 
main paper. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%. 
 
Model Exponential Quasi-hyp. red. Quasi-hyp. full 
Variable Coef. / (SE) Coef. / (SE) Coef. / (SE) 
BT1  -0.072*** -0.122*** -0.095** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
BT2 - -0.055*** -0.070** 
  (0.01) (0.03) 
EMO Factor 0.027 -0.047 0.052 
 (0.48) (0.45) (0.46) 
ANTI Factor 1.770*** 1.909*** 1.979*** 
 (0.48) (0.47) (0.46) 
SS Factor -0.128 -0.092 -0.140 
 (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) 
ANG Factor 0.406 0.327 0.500 
 (0.43) (0.37) (0.38) 
IMP Factor 0.766* 0.777* 0.953** 
 (0.45) (0.46) (0.47) 
EMO x BT1 0.017** 0.056*** 0.023** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
ANTI x BT1 0.004 -0.044*** 0.025 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
SS x BT1 0.001 0.006   0.004 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
ANG x BT1 0.005 0.003 0.014 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
IMP x BT1 0.011* 0.023* 0.017 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EMO x BT2 - - 0.004 
   (0.01) 
ANTI x BT2 - - -0.043** 
   (0.02) 
SS x BT2 - - -0.012 
   (0.01) 
ANG x BT2 - - -0.020 
   (0.01) 
IMP x BT2 - - -0.012 
   (0.01) 
N (# Clusters) 4481 (80) 4481 (80) 4481 (80) 
AICc 18305 18203 18073 
R2 0.41 0.42 0.44 
Prob. > X2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
  
  
Fig. 1: Schematic representations of the trust game setup for the two main treatments, the NPT (no punishment 
treatment; the game ends after stage 2) and the PT (punishment treatment; the game ends after stage 3). All 
values are in Swiss Francs (1 CHF = 1.05 US$). Left: Game-tree where P1’s initial transfer is 10 CHF. Right: 
Game-tree where P1’s initial transfer is 0 CHF. We obtained back transfer rates for two potential scenarios, 
namely for the case in which the investor sent 0 CHF and 10 CHF. The former was included to test pro-social 
motives, which we did not observe (an average of a mere 0.5 CHF was returned when P1 sent 0 CHF). All 
analyses therefore focus on the case in which P1’s initial transfer had been 10CHF. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Investor transfer amounts as a function of punishment condition (absent vs. present) and personality 
factor scores. Graphs visualize main, treatment and interaction effects for each of the five personality traits (A: 
ANTI factor; B: EMO factor; C: IMP factor; D: ANG factor; E: SS factor). Predictions are based on model 3 
(Table 2). Dots: P1’s predicted transfer probabilities for each subject (N = 90) in the no punishment treatment 
(NPT) and the punishment treatment (PT). Solid/dashed lines: Fitted values. All covariates (except factor, 
treatment and interaction of interest) were fixed at their means. 
 
Fig. 3: Investor belief about trustee reciprocity as a function of punishment condition (absent vs. present) and 
personality factor scores. Graphs visualize main, treatment and interaction effects for each of the five personality 
traits (A: ANTI factor; B: EMO factor; C: IMP factor; D: ANG factor; E: SS factor). Predictions are based on 
model 3 (Table 3). Dots: P1's predicted belief about P2's back transfer for each subject (N = 90) in the no 
punishment treatment (NPT) and the punishment treatment (PT). Solid/dashed lines: Fitted values. All 
covariates (except factor, treatment and interaction of interest) were fixed at their means. 
Fig. 4: Trustee back-transfer amounts as a function of punishment condition (absent vs. present) and personality 
factor score. Graphs visualize main, treatment and interaction effects for each of the five personality traits (A: 
ANTI factor; B: EMO factor; C: IMP factor; D: ANG factor; E: SS factor). Predictions are based on model 3 
(Table 4). Dots: P2’s average back transfers for each subject (N = 89) in the no punishment treatment (NPT) and 
the punishment treatment (PT). Solid/dashed lines: Fitted values. All covariates (except factor, treatment and 
interaction of interest) were fixed at their means. 
  
Fig. 5: Investor punishment amounts for given trustee reciprocity and each of the five personality traits (A: 
ANTI factor; B: EMO factor; C: IMP factor; D: ANG factor; E: SS factor), given investor’s initial transfer was 
10 CHF (N = 80). Predictions are based on model 3 (Table 5; Equation S11). All covariates were fixed at their 
means. The factors of interest (“high” vs. “low”) were fixed at the 90th and 10th factor score percentiles, 
respectively. Note: Average factor score differences between the 90th and 10th percentiles varied between 2.5 and 
3.1 factor score units (ANTI factor score difference btw. 90th – 10th p.c. = 2.78 factor score units). The estimated 
marginal effect of a unit increase in ANTI factor scores on punishment severity, given zero back transfers, was 
1.98 CHF (p < 0.01). 
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S.1 Non-binary treatment (NBT)
Trustee back-transfer amounts exhibited a non-linear increase for increasing
investor transfer amounts in the non-binary version of the trust game (NBT).
In order to capture these non-linearities and identify the influences of person-
ality factors on trustees’ reciprocity, we compared five classes of possible back-
transfer response functions: A piecewise linear model, an exponential model,
a standard hyperbolic model, a quasi-hyperbolic model according to Laibson
(1997) and a quasi-hyperbolic model according to Kable & Glimcher (2007).
The goal was to assess differences in effects of personality (i.e. factors) on
back-transfers, including parameters estimating personality related differences
in back-transfer response function slopes (i.e. factors interacted with investor
transfer amounts).
Table S1: Akaike weights: Stage 2 model selection. Model S1: Piecewise linear
model. The kink-point was estimated at T = 9 CHF. Therefore, model S1 in-
cludes a dummy variable (= 1) for investor transfer amounts   9 CHF, D9i,r,bt,
and its interaction with transfer, allowing the intercept and slope to change
after the kink. Model S2: Exponential model. Model S3: Standard hyper-
bolic model. Model S4: Quasi-hyperbolic model according to Laibson (1997).
Model S6: Quasi-hyperbolic, reduced model according to Kable & Glimcher
(2007): Transfer x factor interactions were only included once.
Model # Parameters AICc Di Akaike wi
S1: Piecewise linear 27 31061 240 0
S2: Exponential 25 30831 10 0.0077
S3: Standard hyperbolic 25 31194 373 0
S4: Standard quasi-hyperbolic 25 30833 12 0
S6: Quasi-hyperbolic (reduced) 26 30821 0 0.9923
Model selection was conducted using Akaike weights, wi, based on small
sample size corrected AIC values, AICc (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004; Burn-
ham & Anderson, 2002). Akaike weights reflect the probability that a given
model, Mi, is the best model among the alternative models, given the data. Ta-
ble S1 presents a comparison between five different model specifications. The
following model specifications were employed to investigate the effect of per-
sonality on trustee reciprocity:
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Piecewise linear:
BTi,r,t = c+ aFi + lTi,r,t + b[Ti,r,t · Fi] + rD9i,r,t (S1)
+k[D9i,r,t · Ti,r,t]
Exponential:
BTi,r,t = (c+ aFi) · exp(lTi,r,t + b[Ti,r,t · Fi]) (S2)
Standard hyperbolic:
BTi,r,t = (c+ aFi) · 11+ lTi,r,t + b[Ti,r,t · Fi] (S3)
Standard quasi-hyperbolic:
BTi,r,t = (c+ aFi) · (l+ bFi])Ti,r,t (S4)
Quasi-hyperbolic (full):
BTi,r,t = (c+ aFi) · 12{exp(lTi,r,t + b[Ti,r,t · Fi])+ (S5)
+exp(wTi,r,t + t[Ti,r,t · Fi])}
Quasi-hyperbolic (reduced):
BTi,r,t = (c+ aFi) · 12{exp(lTi,r,t + b[Ti,r,t · Fi])+ (S6)
+exp(wTi,r,t)}
• BTi,r,t : Back-transfer for each individual i, round r and transfer t
• Fi : Vector containing all five factors for each individual i
• c : Constant, treatment-order-dummies, round-one-dummy, session size
and other control variables
• Ti,r,t : Vector containing all ten possible transfers (i.e. 1 - 10 CHF in steps
of 1 CHF)
• l : Slope coefficient (T1)
• w : Slope coefficient (T2)
• a : Five coefficients representing constant level effects of personality fac-
tors (Fi)
• b : Five coefficients representing slope effects of personality factors w.r.t.
transfers (Fi · T1)
• t : Five coefficients representing slope effects of personality factors w.r.t.
transfers (Fi · T2)
The three winningmodels are presented in Table S2. Model S6 is the winner
(see also Fig. S1 A), speaking in favor of a quasi-hyperbolic back-transfer re-
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sponse pattern w.r.t. initial transfers (of note, the full quasi-hyperbolic model,
in which personality factors were interacted with both curvature parameters,
could not be estimated due to collinearity issues). Importantly, all models
yielded the same qualitative results irrespective of model specification:
(1) There was a significant non-linear increase in the amount that was back-
transferred as investor transfers increased, as indicated by significant slope pa-
rameter T2;
(2) Anti-sociality had a strong effect on average back-transfer amounts (p <
0.01, Fig. S1 B), indicative of a general reduction of trustee back-transfers no
matter what the investor initially transferred;
(3) Sensation seeking led to a positive effect on back-transfers via the slope pa-
rameter T1 (p< 0.05, Fig. S1 C), indicative of a faster reduction of back-transfer
amounts with decreasing investor transfers.
Of note, model S6 includes two slope parameters, one being reflective of
trustee back-transfers to low investor transfers (T1) that was not significantly
different from zero, and T2 being reflective of higher trustee back-transfers to
increasing investor transfers (p < 0.01; given that the coefficient T2 is larger
than T1, the former reflects a special weight placed on higher transfers; T1 and
T2 in this model have to be interpreted relative to T1 in the exponential model).
Fig. S1 B and Fig. S1 C illustrate the effects (predicted back-transfers in model
S6) for ”low” and ”high” (10th vs. 90th factor score percentiles) anti-social and
sensation seeking trustees, respectively.
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Fig. S1: A: Back-transfer amounts of P2, given P1’s initial transfer. Note: Cir-
cle areas are proportional to the frequency of duplicated observations in each
point of the Transfer/BackTransfer-space. Fitted values (model S6): All co-
variates were fixed at their means. B: Quasi-hyperbolic back-transfer response
functions for ”low” and ”high” anti-social trustees (model S6). Fitted values:
Values of ANTI Factor were fixed at 10th and 90th percentile, respectively. All
other covariates were fixed at their means. C: Quasi-hyperbolic back-transfer
response functions for ”low” and ”high” sensation seeking trustees (model S6).
Fitted values: Values of SS Factor were fixed at 10th and 90th percentile, respec-
tively. All other covariates were fixed at their means.
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Table S2: Non-linear regressions investigating the effect of personality on the
trustees’ back-transfers (BT) in the non-binary treatment without punishment
(NBT). The model included a number of control variables which are gender
(male = 1), age, as well as culture encoded as being Swiss or not, and city,
reflective of living in a city with > 10’000 inhabitants. Results from the three
best models as identified by model comparison (see Table S1) are presented.
Constant, treatment-order-dummies, round-one-dummy and session size are
not reported in the table.
Model S4 S2 S6
Variable Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE)
T1 1.209*** 0.189*** 0.117
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07)
T2 – – 0.205***
(0.02)
Male 0.315 0.325 0.411*
(0.22) (0.22) (0.24)
City 0.207 0.205 0.133
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Swiss -0.229 -0.229 -0.246
(0.22) (0.22) (0.25)
Age 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.101***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
PSS 0.004 0.005 0.017
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
MDBF 0.008 0.008 0.019
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
EMO Factor 0.123 0.140 0.295
(0.17) (0.17) (0.19)
ANTI Factor -0.685*** -0.673*** -0.565***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
SS Factor -0.364** -0.362** -0.286
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
ANG Factor -0.149 -0.162 -0.216
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22)
IMP Factor 0.092 0.109 0.304
(0.16) (0.16) (0.19)
EMO x T1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.026
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
ANTI x T1 0.009 0.006 -0.019
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
SS x T1 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.091**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
ANG x T1 -0.003 -0.002 -0.016
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
IMP x T1 0.007 0.005 -0.016
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
N (# Clusters) 5340 (89)
R2 0.52 0.52 0.52
Prob. > c2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%.
Robust standard errors, clustered by subjects.
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S.2 Punishment response functions
Investor punishment amounts exhibited a non-linear increase for decreasing
trustee back-transfer amounts. In order to capture these nonlinearities and
identify the influences of personality factors on punishment behavior, we com-
pared five classes of possible punishment response functions: A piecewise
linear model, an exponential model, a standard hyperbolic model, a quasi-
hyperbolic model according to Laibson (1997) and a quasi-hyperbolic model
according to Kable & Glimcher (2007). The goal was to assess differences in
effects of personality (i.e. factors) on the amount spent for punishment, in-
cluding parameters estimating personality related differences in punishment
response function slopes (i.e. factors interacted with back-transfer).
Table S3: Akaike weights: Stage 3 model selection. Model S7: Piecewise lin-
ear model. The kink-point was estimated at back-transfer = 25 CHF. There-
fore, model S7 includes a dummy variable (= 1) for back-transfers   25 CHF,
D25i,r,bt, and its interaction with back-transfer, allowing the intercept and slope
to change after the kink. Model S8: Exponential model. Model S9: Stan-
dard hyperbolic model. Model S10: Quasi-hyperbolic model according to
Laibson (1997). Model S11: Quasi-hyperbolic, full model according to Kable
& Glimcher (2007): Double-exponential framework, where the different slope
parameters (l vs. w for the average back-transfer response, and b vs. t for
the back-transfer x factor interactions) reflect a special weight placed on either
lower or higher (depending on their relative size) back-transfers. Model S12:
Quasi-hyperbolic, reduced model according to Kable & Glimcher (2007): Back-
transfer x factor interactions were only included once.
Model # Parameters AICc Di Akaike wi
S7: Piecewise linear 27 18544 471 0
S8: Exponential 25 18305 232 0
S9: Standard hyperbolic 25 18461 388 0
S10: Standard quasi-hyperbolic 25 18308 235 0
S11: Quasi-hyperbolic (full) 31 18073 0 1
S12: Quasi-hyperbolic (reduced) 26 18203 130 0
Model selection was conducted using Akaike weights, wi, based on small
sample size corrected AIC values, AICc (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004; Burn-
ham & Anderson, 2002). Akaike weights reflect the probability that a given
model, Mi, is the best model among the alternative models, given the data. Ta-
ble S3 presents a comparison between six different model specifications. The
following model specifications were employed to investigate the effect of per-
sonality on investor punishment behavior:
Piecewise linear:
Pi,r,bt = c+ aFi + lBTi,r,bt + b[BTi,r,bt · Fi] + rD25i,r,bt (S7)
+k[D25i,r,bt · BTi,r,bt]
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Exponential:
Pi,r,bt = (c+ aFi) · exp(lBTi,r,bt + b[BTi,r,bt · Fi]) (S8)
Standard hyperbolic:
Pi,r,bt = (c+ aFi) · 11+ lBTi,r,bt + b[BTi,r,bt · Fi] (S9)
Standard quasi-hyperbolic:
Pi,r,bt = (c+ aFi) · (l+ bFi])BTi,r,bt (S10)
Quasi-hyperbolic (full):
Pi,r,bt = (c+ aFi) · 12{exp(lBTi,r,bt + b[BTi,r,bt · Fi])+ (S11)
+exp(wBTi,r,bt + t[BTi,r,bt · Fi])}
Quasi-hyperbolic (reduced):
Pi,r,bt = (c+ aFi) · 12{exp(lBTi,r,bt + b[BTi,r,bt · Fi])+ (S12)
+exp(wBTi,r,bt)}
• Pi,r,bt : Amount spent for punishment of each individual i, round r and
back-transfer bt
• Fi : Vector containing all five factors for each individual i
• c : Constant, treatment-order-dummies, round-one-dummy, session size
and other control variables
• BTi,r,bt : Vector containing all eleven possible back-transfers (i.e. 0 - 50
CHF in steps of 5 CHF)
• l : Slope coefficient (BT1)
• w : Slope coefficient (BT2)
• a : Five coefficients representing constant level effects of personality fac-
tors (Fi)
• b : Five coefficients representing slope effects of personality factors w.r.t.
back-transfers (Fi · BT1)
• t : Five coefficients representing slope effects of personality factors w.r.t.
back-transfers (Fi · BT2)
The three winning models and a description of the results are presented in
the main paper (Table 5). Model S11 was the clear winner (see also Fig. S2),
speaking in favor of a quasi-hyperbolic punishment response pattern w.r.t.
back-transfers. Given that the slope coefficient BT1 is more negative than BT2,
the former reflects a special weight placed on lower back-transfers (both p <
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Fig. S2: Amount spent by P1s to punish P2s conditional on P2s’ back-transfers
(P), given T = 10 CHF. Note: Circle areas are proportional to the frequency of
duplicated observations in each point of the BackTransfer/Punishment-space.
Fitted values (model S11): All covariates were fixed at their means.
0.05; BT1 and BT2 in this model have to be interpreted relative to BT1 in the
exponential model). Note, however, that the main story did not change, no
matter what kind of model specification we applied:
(1) Investor punishment amounts decreased non-linearlywith increasing trustee
back-transfer amounts, reaching near zero after back-transfers of 25 CHF or
higher;
(2) Anti-sociality exhibited a strong positive effect (p < 0.01) on the amount
spent for punishing low back-transfers, but decreasing rapidly for higher back-
transfers;
(3) Impulsivity exhibited a positive level effect (p < 0.05) on punishment;
(4) Emotional reactivity flattened out the slope of the punishment response
function (p < 0.05), especially in the low back-transfer domain.
Equation S13 shows the partial derivative of the punishment response func-
tion (model S11) with respect to the ANTI factor ( f2). For a back-transfer (BT)
of 0 CHF, a unit increase in ANTI factor scores led to an increase in punishment
of a2 = 1.98 CHF. This effect became smaller for larger back-transfers (Pi,r,bt is
strictly monotonically decreasing in BT) and finally disappeared.
∂Pi,r,bt
∂ f2
= (c+ aFi) · BT · 12{b2 · exp(lBTi,r,bt + b[BTi,r,bt · Fi])+ (S13)
t2 · exp(wBTi,r,bt + t[BTi,r,bt · Fi])}+ a2 · 12{exp(lBTi,r,bt+
b[BTi,r,bt · Fi]) + exp(wBTi,r,bt + t[BTi,r,bt · Fi])}
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S.3 Strategy method (PT) vs. direct feedback (DT)
We investigated the influence of personality on differential trust taking and
reciprocity behavior in direct feedback and strategy method settings. We find
a significant level effect that reflects enhanced trust taking and enhanced back-
transfer amounts in the direct feedback environment DT (on average, 14 %-
points higher transfer probability and 3 CHF higher back-transfer; p < 0.01).
We find no differential effect of personality on the propensity to trust in the
arousing direct feedback relative to the no feedback environment. For trustee
reciprocity, we replicate two results reported in the analyses in Table 4, namely
that both anti-sociality and anger lead to marginally significant decreases in
back-transfer rates (p < 0.1). Furthermore, we observe a marginally significant
interaction between anti-sociality and the environment, indicating that anti-
sociality is associated with increased back-transfer rates in the direct feedback
environment relative to the strategy method (p < 0.1, Table S4). This result
indicates that immediate feedback about punishment enhances the strategic
shift in back-transfer amounts within the punishment environment reported
above. No other systematic differences in the effects of personality on trust
taking and reciprocity were observed when comparing the strategy method
to the direct feedback environment (Table S4). Of note, the model fit (regard-
ing AICc) slightly decreased when controlling for the personality x treatment
interactions.
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S.3.1 Stage 1 and 2: Transfer and back-transfer
Table S4: Regressions investigating the effect of personality on the propensity
to trust (T) and back-transfers (BT) in the punishment treatment (PT) compared
to the direct feedback (with punishment) treatment (DT). DT is a dummy vari-
able reflective of the presence of direct feedback. Themodel included a number
of control variables which are gender (male = 1), age, as well as culture encoded
as being Swiss or not, and city, reflective of living in a city with> 10’000 inhab-
itants. Constant, treatment-order-dummies, round-one-dummy and session
size are not reported in the table.
Model #1 #2 #1 #2
Dep. Variable T (Logit) T (Logit) BT (OLS) BT (OLS)
Variable Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE)
DT 1.227*** 1.256*** 2.995*** 3.271***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.85) (0.96)
Male 0.069 0.061 2.878* 2.840*
(0.43) (0.44) (1.51) (1.50)
City -1.051** -1.063** -0.185 -0.212
(0.47) (0.46) (1.23) (1.22)
Swiss -0.107 -0.091 -0.633 -0.777
(0.44) (0.44) (1.25) (1.24)
Age 0.050 0.051 -0.013 0.007
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12)
MDBF 0.035 0.035 0.289 0.266
(0.10) (0.10) (0.22) (0.22)
PSS -0.120** -0.119** -0.031 -0.030
(0.06) (0.06) (0.19) (0.19)
EMO Factor 0.187 0.285 0.462 0.373
(0.24) (0.24) (0.85) (0.95)
ANTI Factor 0.115 0.086 -1.009 -1.298*
(0.25) (0.28) (0.63) (0.71)
SS Factor 0.436*** 0.460*** 0.562 0.426
(0.17) (0.17) (0.59) (0.73)
ANG Factor -0.068 -0.066 -1.128* -1.266*
(0.15) (0.16) (0.63) (0.70)
IMP Factor 0.356 0.283 0.139 0.010
(0.27) (0.30) (0.47) (0.57)
EMO x DT – -0.298 – 0.298
(0.19) (0.70)
ANTI x DT – 0.087 – 1.143*
(0.29) (0.68)
SS x DT – -0.041 – 0.457
(0.16) (0.78)
ANG x DT – -0.018 – 0.630
(0.18) (0.78)
IMP x DT – 0.216 – 0.428
(0.26) (0.64)
N (# Clusters) 1080 (90) 1080 (90) 738 (89) 738 (89)
AICc 892 899 5011 5015
(Pseudo) R2 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.14
Prob. > c2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%.
Robust standard errors, clustered by subjects.
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S.4 Relationship between risk attitudes and trust
We investigated the relationship between trust taking and risk attitudes, which
has been a recurring concern in the literature (Houser, Schunk & Winter, 2010;
Altmann, Dohmen & Wibral, 2008). To dissociate the association between per-
sonality and trust taking from potential influences of risk attitudes, we an-
swered the following questions: (1) Is there a general relationship between
trust and risk taking?; (2) Is there a relationship between personality and risk
attitude as suggested by previous research (Capra et al., 2013) and how does
it differ from the relationship between personality and social preferences? If
the answer to the former questions was positive, this indicates that trust and
risk are somehow interrelated, as well as that personality influences risk atti-
tudes. We therefore asked additionally (3) whether risk attitude can explain
the differential behavior under different environments, given that one possible
explanation of the observed investment behavior during punishment may be a
reduction in the perception of the riskiness of trust due to the ability to punish.
S.4.1 Research methods
After completion of all the trust games, a subset of 104 participants made risky
decisions in the context of a certainty equivalent task. The task consisted of a
total of 126 individual decisions, in which each choice scenario offered an alter-
native between choosing a probabilistic lottery and a sure amount. The lottery
offered one potential payoff that is greater than the sure amount, and one that is
smaller. The payout was determined by randomly selecting 1 of the 126 choice
scenarios for which participants earned additional cash amounts between 0
and 50 CHF. Importantly, to reduce the likelihood that knowledge about the
risk task influenced trust decisions, subjects were informed of this task only
after completion of all trust games. Furthermore, information of trust game
winnings was provided after completion of all risk decisions. It is therefore
unlikely that decisions on one task influenced decisions on the other.
For the remainder of subjects (N = 78), risk attitudes were assessed via a se-
ries of six choices between a lottery (same in all trials: 50 % chance of winning
either 10 CHF or 0.5 CHF) and increasing amounts of safe payments (increas-
ing from 2 CHF to 7.5 CHF). The switching point, reflective of the certainty
equivalent in this choice scenario, is taken as a measure of risk attitude. The
payout was determined by randomly selecting one of the six lotteries for which
participants earned additional cash amounts between 0.5 CHF and 10 CHF.
To disentangle trust from risk preferences, we investigated if individual risk
parameters (according to the functional form presented in Lattimore, Baker &
Witte (1992)) exhibit effects on the propensity to trust, reciprocate and punish,
and if personality shows effects on risk parameters, including a (reflective of
the curvature of the subjective value function v(x); measures the degree of risk
aversion), b (reflective of the elevation of the probability weighting function
w(p); measures attractiveness of gambling) and g (reflective of the curvature
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of w(p); measures weighting discriminability), as well as CE (certainty equiv-
alents; reflective of the switching point of a lottery) for a subset of subjects.
(1) We investigated the associations between risk parameters and propensity
to trust in all four versions of the trust game, i.e., the NBT, NPT, PT and DT
(Table S5). To this end, we conducted regressions that were equivalent to those
conducted for stage one of the trust games reported in the main paper, how-
ever, with risk parameters as the main independent variables of interest and
the propensity to trust as dependent variables.
(2) To address the question whether personality predicts risk attitudes, we ex-
amined whether different personality variables show an effect on risk com-
pared to trust taking and reciprocity. We investigated the association between
personality and risk parameters using precision-weightedWLS regressionswith
risk characteristics as dependent variables and personality as independent vari-
ables (Table S6).
(3) To investigate whether risk attitudes predict differential trust taking and
reciprocity across punishment environments, we run OLS regressions with the
propensity to trust and reciprocity as dependent variables and risk parameters
as independent variables. Importantly, we included punishment as a predictor
variable in all regressions and interacted punishment with risk parameters to
investigate the degree to which risk characteristics differentially predict trust
game decisions depending on P1s’ option to punish or not (Table S7).
S.4.2 Probability weighting and subjective value function
Risk parameters were estimated⇤ for a sub-sample of 104 subjects, where for
five individuals, parameters could not be estimated properly (minus 2 out-
liers from questionnaire task: Total N = 97 subjects). Estimated coefficients
represent individual LBW† (Lattimor, Baker & Witte, 1992) weighting function
parameters:
EVSure,i = swai (S14)
EVLottery,i = (1  wi(p1))zai1 + wi(p1)zai2 (S15)
DEVi = EVLottery,i   EVSure,i (S16)
wi(p1) =
bi p
gi
1
bi p
gi
1 + (1  p1)gi
(S17)
Pi(ChooseLottery) =
1
1+ exp( tiDEVi) (S18)
where in each trial (T = 126 choice scenarios), sw was the sure win, z1 was
the lottery amount smaller than sw and z2 was the lottery amount larger than
⇤Maximum likelihood estimation with Newton-Raphson algorithm.
†Note that we compared different weighting functions. The LBW function fitted the data best
(lowest AICc), followed by the Prelec weighting function (Prelec, 1998), but the average AICc
difference was small and insignificant.
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sw, p1 was the winning probability, wi(p1) was the weighting function, DEVi
was the risk premium and Pi(ChooseLottery) was the probability of choosing
the lottery instead of the sure amount. a is reflective of the curvature of the
subjective value function v(x), measuring the degree of risk aversion. b is re-
flective of the elevation of the probability weighting function w(p), measuring
the attractiveness of gambling. g is reflective of the curvature of w(p), measur-
ing the weighting discriminability. t measures the sensitivity of choice prob-
ability to the value difference and, hence, measures the degree of randomness
in choice behavior (Hsu et al., 2009). This parameter was not included in later
analyses.
S.4.3 Risk task results
The association between LBW risk parameters and propensity to trust in all
four versions of the trust game (NBT, NPT, PT, DT) is shown in Table S5. In the
two treatments without punishment, b (attractiveness of gambling) exhibited
a positive effect on the propensity to trust (NBT: p < 0.01; NPT: p < 0.1).
We focus our discussion on investor decisions in the non-binary version
(NBT) of the trust game, because such a continuous measure of trust taking
is a more sensitive measure for investigations concerning the relationship be-
tween trust and risk taking. We found a significant relationship between in-
vestor trust taking and the intercept parameter (b; p < 0.01) of the probability
weighting function w(p). This effect is consistent across the trust games with-
out a punishment option (NPT and NBT). This result indicates that greater
optimism in the risk domain translates to greater propensity to trust, but only
in the absence of punishment, as this effect disappears in those trust games
that included a punishment option. This replicates prior observations reported
in the literature (e.g. Altmann, Dohmen & Wibral, 2008) that have shown that
trust taking and risk attitudes are related.
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Table S5: OLS and Logit regressions investigating the effects of individual risk
parameters a (subjective value of money; measures the degree of risk aver-
sion), b (elevation; measures the attractiveness of gambling) and g (curvature;
measures the weighting discriminability) on the propensity to trust (T) in all
four treatment conditions. The model included a number of control variables
which are gender (male = 1), age, as well as culture encoded as being Swiss
or not, and city, reflective of living in a city with > 10’000 inhabitants. Con-
stant, treatment-order-dummies, round-one-dummy and session size are not
reported in the table.
Treatment NBT (OLS) NPT (Logit) PT (Logit) DT (Logit)
Variable Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE)
Male -2.071** -0.758 0.071 0.441
(0.82) (0.49) (0.58) (0.74)
City -0.808 -0.551 -1.807** -1.291*
(0.84) (0.45) (0.72) (0.74)
Swiss 1.447 0.432 0.416 -0.259
(1.24) (0.62) (0.67) (0.85)
Age -0.002 0.022 0.179* 0.534***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.20)
MDBF 0.240 0.247* 0.204* 0.206
(0.20) (0.13) (0.12) (0.18)
PSS -0.149 -0.020 -0.015 -0.162*
(0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09)
a 2.537 -0.970 -1.119 -2.884
(2.35) (1.41) (1.62) (2.65)
b 5.038*** 2.145* 0.918 -0.140
(1.56) (1.13) (1.48) (1.58)
g 2.948 0.085 -0.455 -2.078
(2.43) (1.32) (1.48) (1.77)
N (# Clusters) 312 (52)
(Pseudo) R2 0.37 0.19 0.27 0.28
Prob. > c2 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.43
Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%.
Robust standard errors, clustered by subjects.
The association between personality and LBW risk parameters was inves-
tigated using precision-weighted WLS regressions. Only b was significantly
affected by personality (p < 0.01), showing strong positive effects for sensa-
tion seeking and impulsive traits and supporting previous reports of the re-
lationship between personality and risk parameters (Capra et al., 2013). As a
higher b-value shifts the weighting curve upwards, such traits tended to in-
crease the attractiveness of gambling. Of note, these results are qualitatively
different from the association between personality characteristics and trust and
reciprocity as reported in the main paper in Table 2 and Table 4, respectively.
Important for our findings, anti-sociality did not affect risk-taking behav-
ior. This shows that personality has a somewhat dissociable effect in trust and
risk taking. Also no other significant associations between risk attitudes and
personality were found.‡ Specifically, personality did not exhibit an effect on
‡Higher ANG factor scores tended to lower certainty equivalents (CE), but the overall regres-
sion was insignificant (p > 0.43).
14
the curvature of v(x) as well as on the curvature of w(p), as indicated by in-
significant regressions investigating the influence of personality on a and g (p
> 0.1; Table S6).
Table S6: Regressions for individual risk and weighting function parameters
a (subjective value of money; measures degree of risk aversion), b (elevation;
measures the attractiveness of gambling), g (curvature; measures the weight-
ing discriminability) and CE (certainty equivalent) on personality variables.
The model included a number of control variables which are gender (male
= 1), age, as well as culture encoded as being Swiss or not, and city, reflec-
tive of being from a city > 10’000 inhabitants. Constant and session-dummies
are not reported in the table. Note: a, b and g regressions are based on a
MEMA (mixed-effects multilevel analysis) framework according to Chen et al.
(2012). Weighted least squares (WLS) regressions accounted for heterogeneous
within-subject variability sˆi2 in estimated risk parameters. tˆ2 were the REML
(restricted maximum likelihood) estimates of between-subject variance.
Subjective value /
Weighting function a b g CE
parameter / CE
Variable Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE)
Male 0.065 -0.072 0.064 -0.008
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.26)
City -0.055 0.035 -0.024 0.074
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.20)
Swiss -0.011 -0.093 -0.056 -0.029
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.21)
Age 0.008 -0.012 0.011 -0.040*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
MDBF 0.001 -0.022* 0.014 0.004
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
PSS 0.004 -0.012* -0.002 -0.034
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
EMO Factor -0.016 0.021 0.036 0.035
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14)
ANTI Factor 0.008 0.040 -0.013 -0.142
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.13)
SS Factor -0.011 0.107*** 0.022 -0.078
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11)
ANG Factor -0.009 -0.003 0.002 -0.266**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10)
IMP Factor -0.022 0.070*** -0.034 0.096
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10)
tˆ2 0.017 0.036 0.038 –
N 97 97 97 76
R2 0.17 0.35 0.17 0.14
Prob. > F 0.39 0.00 0.55 0.43
Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%.
Likelihood-ratio test for tˆ2 = 0: Prob. > c2 = 0.00
Weighting matrix: diag.
✓
1
tˆ2 + sˆi
2
◆
Finally, to address the question whether risk attitudes can explain differen-
tial behavior under different punishment environments in the trust game, we
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investigated the combined effect of risk parameters and the option to punish
on trust taking and reciprocity.
The propensity to trust was not significantly affected by risk parameters
(Table S7; note that results focus on reduced models #1 and #3, which both had
a lower AICc). We found a weak (p < 0.1) positive effect of b and a significant
positive effect of g on back-transfers (p < 0.05). a showed no significant effect
on both the propensity to trust and back-transfer amounts. Importantly, inter-
actions with the treatment dummy PT were insignificant, indicating that risk
parameters did not affect trust taking differentially across punishment environ-
ments. This latter point was further affirmed by the findings that the reduced
models without interaction terms provided better model fits.§
S.4.4 Risk task conclusions
Results indicate that individual risk attitudes did not have an impact on the
relationships between trust and personality, as well as reciprocity and person-
ality because (1) the personality variables that showed a relationship with risk
parameters were different from those that exhibited an association with social
choice parameters and (2) risk attitudes do not explain the changes in behav-
ior in the presence relative to the absence of punishment. In all, our results
indicate that decisions to trust and to reciprocate in anonymous one-shot in-
teractions were only marginally explained by risk taking characteristics (Fehr,
2009; Houser, Schunk & Winter, 2010). Importantly, risk attitudes did not ac-
count for behavioral changes in the punishment environment.
§Note: We also investigated the whether risk attitudes measured by certainty equivalents (CE)
predict trust taking across punishment environments. We did not find an effect of CEs on the
decision to transfer 10 CHF, as well as on back-transfers. Importantly, interactions of CEs with the
treatment dummy PT did not affect trust game outcomes either.
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Table S7: Regressions investigating the effect of risk and weighting function
parameters a (subjective value of money; measures degree of risk aversion),
b (elevation; measures the attractiveness of gambling) and g (curvature; mea-
sures the weighting discriminability) on the propensity to trust (T) and back-
transfers (BT) in the presence compared to the absence of the option to punish.
PT is a dummy variable reflective of the option to punish. The model included
a number of control variables which are gender (male = 1), age, as well as cul-
ture encoded as being Swiss or not, and city, reflective of living in a city with
> 10’000 inhabitants. Constant, treatment-order-dummies, round-one-dummy
and session size are not reported in the table.
Model #1 #2 #3 #4
Dep. Variable T (Logit) T (Logit) BT (OLS) BT (OLS)
Variable Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE)
PT 0.757*** 1.378 5.856*** 11.537*
(0.22) (1.09) (1.30) (6.22)
Male -0.708 -0.710 -3.210** -3.210**
(0.47) (0.47) (1.52) (1.53)
City -0.578 -0.581 -0.089 -0.089
(0.55) (0.55) (1.94) (1.95)
Swiss 0.356 0.347 0.659 0.659
(0.66) (0.66) (1.74) (1.75)
Age 0.109 0.109 0.752** 0.752**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.31) (0.31)
MDBF 0.263** 0.263** -0.201 -0.201
(0.12) (0.12) (0.32) (0.32)
PSS 0.004 0.004 0.067 0.067
(0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.14)
a -1.095 -0.901 4.981 7.977
(1.62) (1.69) (3.94) (5.19)
b 1.852 2.216* 4.809* 6.920*
(1.21) (1.23) (2.67) (3.90)
g -1.229 -1.355 10.072** 7.790
(1.50) (1.50) (3.83) (4.82)
a x PT – -0.394 – -5.992
(0.98) (5.71)
b x PT – -0.795 – -4.222
(0.86) (3.99)
g x PT – 0.300 – 4.565
(1.46) (4.93)
N (# Clusters) 624 (52) 624 (52) 540 (45) 540 (45)
AICc 639 654 3698 3710
(Pseudo) R2 0.21 0.21 0.36 0.37
Prob. > c2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%.
Robust standard errors, clustered by subjects.
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